

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 18 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. LALL

(India)

62-13352

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de BELLO-FRANCO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. J. E. G. HARDY

Mr. J. F. M. BELL

Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU

Mr. M. HAID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Mr. K. K. RAO

Mr. C. K. GAIROLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVILLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALEZ GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A. A. ATTA

Poland:

Mr. M. NACZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. W. WIECISZEK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Baron C. H. von PLATEN  
Mr. G. A. WESTRING  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. A. ZORIN  
Mr. A. A. ROSECHIN  
Mr. I. G. USACHEV  
Mr. V. N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M. S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J. S. H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. D. T. PRICE

United States of America:

Mr. A. H. DEAN  
Mr. J. C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. C. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the thirty-ninth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Many statements have been made recently by certain Western Delegations on the question of controlling various disarmament measures and, more particularly, on the possibility of exercising effective control over the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage of disarmament.

In some of these statements, control and verification have been referred to as central questions, vital for disarmament. At the thirty-eighth meeting of the Committee, Mr. Burns, the Canadian representative, speaking of certain disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union for stage I and, in particular, of the elimination of rockets and other delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, said:

"The position of the Western Powers is that we must consider the verification of the measure before we know if it is acceptable, in conformity with the sixth Agreed Principle which I have quoted previously: 'All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations'" (ENDC/PV.38, page 22).

Mr. Burns continued:

"If any measure is proposed which is incapable of being so verified, then it is not in accordance with the Agreed Principles and should not have a place in the eventually agreed treaty." (ibid.)

That statement is fraught with consequences for the whole of our work of drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The way the Canadian representative has put the matter leaves some doubt about the possibility of reaching agreement at present on any disarmament measure whatever and, in general, of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. How are we to reconcile such a position with the attempts of the Western representatives to show us that they are resolved to achieve general and complete disarmament and will spare no effort to do so? The statements of the Canadian representative which I have just referred to are a further proof that we were right in the comments we made on 11 May on the actual conception of the Western plan, and in particular, in saying that not only is this United States plan wrongly conceived, but all the measures it provides for are so framed as to make general and complete disarmament impossible.

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In the series of statements he has made recently with the evident intention of showing that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage - in particular, the measures for total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles - were not practicable, the Canadian representative has rather given the impression that these measures are unacceptable not because of the inadequacy of control, but simply because the Western delegations do not like them. For instance, on 11 May Mr. Burns tried to show that the statement made by the Soviet Union representative to the effect that elimination of the means of delivery nuclear weapons would remove practically all danger of a nuclear attack might seem to be logical, but that, as he himself believed, we should take account of the psychological as well as the logical factor in the disarmament process. He added:

"It is an obvious conclusion that if there were no vehicles there could be no surprise attack, but the problem really is to be sure that in fact no vehicles remain." (ENDC/PV.35, page 41)

The last part of this sentence is surprising, to say the least, in view of the statements made by the other Western representatives, in particular those of the United States and the United Kingdom, and of the opinion of all the delegations on this Committee. It has, indeed, been stated several times that control and verification cannot be considered to provide a 100 per cent guarantee, and that disarmament obviously entails certain responsibilities and uncertainties which States are willing to accept. But the representative of Canada is pressing for the certainty that in fact no vehicles remain, that is to say, for a 100 per cent guarantee.

Immediately after making this astonishing statement, the Canadian representative continued:

"Let us consider in realistic terms what prevents any kind of nuclear attack in the world today. It is the knowledge of each side that if it unleashed a nuclear war it would bring upon itself a terrible retaliation by the nuclear armaments of the other side." (ibid.)

A little later in his statement the Canadian representative developed the theory that the threat of a nuclear attack is not proportional to the absolute level of nuclear weapon vehicles, but would increase when their number reached a low level. He concluded:

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"That is to say, if the nuclear weapons and vehicles of both sides are in balance, as by and large they are today, they know that neither one can undertake such an attack without suffering an unsustainable counter-blow. The danger would arise if one side could acquire sufficient superiority over the other to justify a surprise attack ..." (ibid., page 42)

According to the representative of Canada, this would be the case if we were tempted to adopt measures such as those proposed by the Soviet Union for the rapid and total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

This thesis was certainly not invented yesterday. It was the basis of the famous balance of terror; it was also the basis of the theory of the alleged necessity of maintaining in readiness the famous deterrent force which still conditions the thinking of certain strategists in the West. What surprises us is that this thesis should have been advanced in a Committee that is discussing disarmament, not the balance of armaments, and, among others, by someone as well versed in the subject as the representative of Canada.

We are surprised to note that in trying to show that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for implementing an agreement on general and complete disarmament and, in particular, for the rapid elimination of certain weapons whose disappearance could practically preclude all possibility of a nuclear war by the end of the first stage of general and complete disarmament - that in trying to show that these measures are not feasible, General Burns borrowed the proofs and arguments adduced by one of the best known Western exponents, not of general disarmament, but of armaments control, the stabilization of the arms race and the balance of terror: Dr. Kissinger.

To quote only one example, in his article "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack" published in Foreign Affairs for July 1960 (vol. 38, no. 4), Dr. Kissinger speaks of the need for "stabilizing the arms race", not the need for carrying out disarmament, still less general and complete disarmament. In order to justify a precarious balance, which they call "stability" - the term is used very often - certain delegations use the arguments of Dr. Kissinger, who says in the same article:

"If the number of permissible long-range missiles is set at zero - if, in other words, both sides agreed to destroy all ICBM's and nuclear weapons - even a small evasion, say ten hidden missiles, will confer a decisive advantage.

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And such an evasion is almost impossible to discover. If the number is set very low, say at ten, an additional fifteen may make a surprise attack possible ... On the other hand, if the number is set relatively high, say at 500, even a fairly substantial violation would not confer a decisive advantage. In that case, fifty additional long-range missiles would not enable the violator to launch a surprise attack."

The reasoning used here by certain delegations is strangely like Dr. Kissinger's: the aim is not to achieve general and complete disarmament, but to secure control over existing armaments, the stabilization of the arms race, and, hence, its continuation. This kind of reasoning by certain Western delegations is, in my opinion, a further proof that they lack the will and the desire to reach an agreement to carry out general and complete disarmament. Moreover, all their statements on control reveal, I say again, the erroneous basic concept underlying the United States plan.

In our opinion, however, the question is not whether we could control the disarmament measures proposed in the Soviet draft - I shall revert to that point later - but whether we agree to adopt the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union in its draft treaty, which are real disarmament measures. With regard to control, as the Soviet representative has pointed out, once we agree on the disarmament measures to be adopted, it will always be possible to agree upon the corresponding verification measures.

In his statement on 16 May, the Soviet Union representative emphasized that the difficulties and obstacles are in no way due to the alleged unwillingness of the Soviet Union to say how many control posts and inspectors there should be on its territory, but to the reluctance of the Western Powers to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. He then said:

"These are all minor points." (he was referring to the information requested by certain Western delegations on the number of control posts and the freedom of movement of inspectors in Soviet territory) "We can reach agreement on all this; these are practical questions. But let us agree on what you are prepared to accept in the matter of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.38, pages 48-49)

The Soviet representative's conclusion that there are differences on disarmament measures is, moreover, confirmed by many statements made by the Western delegations.

In his statement on 11 May, Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, said:



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"But as all delegations here have by now come to know very well, the West does not agree with the way in which the Soviet Union proposes to carry out disarmament for several other reasons besides those that we have given in criticism of its inadequate provisions for control."

(ENDC/PV.35, page 38)

As we can see, it is not a matter of the corresponding control measures required to verify the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union; it is those disarmament measures themselves that are not to the liking of the Western Powers.

Nevertheless, the representatives of the Western Powers continue, in their statements, to make the organization of disarmament control one of the major obstacles - the stumbling block - to all our efforts to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. They continue to discuss the alleged inadequacy of control and verification measures to be applied to disarmament measures which they are, a priori, unwilling to accept. This only leads to the prolongation ad infinitum of our discussion on the control of measures which appear unacceptable to the West for reasons other than those the Western delegations advance in this Committee.

Thus we go on endlessly discussing control in the abstract, with the result that we are not getting down to the work of formulating a disarmament programme and reaching agreement on it.

We consider that all discussion on control should be closely linked with the implementation of concrete disarmament measures. But the Western delegations are trying to draw us into a fruitless discussion on methods of control and hypothetical disarmament measures which they reject as such a priori. Some of them have even attempted to justify this procedure.

In his statement of 16 May, Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, resorted to formulae and even to mathematical language which, according to him, demonstrated the need to discuss control first. He expressed himself as follows:

"What we have got to try to do is reach a solution by a series of successive approximations, if I can use a mathematical term here, in which political and technical views are looked at alternately until some kind of solution satisfying everybody is hammered out. I think we have got to think of the practicalities of this." (ENDC/PV.38, page 39)

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It is hardly necessary to point out that we could go on talking for ever on those lines, i.e. by a series of successive approximations, for the series of successive approximations are themselves infinite if we start from an unstable basis and attempts are constantly being made to change the initial data of the problem to be solved - and the initial data are, of course, the disarmament measures. Now we are convinced that in order to be able to reach a solution of our problem it is necessary, as in solving any problem, to have initial data on which we can go to work - even, if you like, using the method of successive approximations.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria therefore believes that we should stop these interminable discussions on hypothetical problems and apply ourselves to defining the initial data of the problem we have to solve, to defining the disarmament measures which would be acceptable to both parties, and to working out concomitant control measures. It was with this end in view that at yesterday's informal meeting of the Committee we put the following question to certain Western delegations: How can we define the functions and objectives, the nature and extent of control, without having some idea of the nature and extent of the disarmament measures?

Yesterday our question was not answered by the Western delegations. Perhaps that was because there was not enough time. In any event, it is clear that without precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the disarmament measures, it is not only extremely difficult, but even impossible to define the objectives, nature and scope of the corresponding control and verification measures.

To sum up, it is becoming more and more obvious that we cannot go on endlessly discussing control without fixing the initial data we need for solving the problems of disarmament, that is to say, without defining the measures which both sides are willing to accept in the first and subsequent stages of general and complete disarmament.

In this connexion, and with a view to facilitating the work of this Conference, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers it necessary to define the disarmament measures that are acceptable to the parties both in the first and in the subsequent stages of disarmament, and only afterwards to discuss control measures to ensure their application. We therefore propose, first, that the co-Chairmen be requested to explore the possibility of agreeing on a joint plan for the first stage of general and complete disarmament and, in particular,

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the possibility of setting time-limits for that stage which would be acceptable to the parties; secondly, that in future, our discussion should be directed first towards defining the disarmament measures which the parties are willing to accept for the stage of disarmament in question, and then towards defining all the necessary measures for carrying out that stage.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): Last week's debates and those of the week now ending have seen important progress in our work. First, there was the statement by Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative, that his delegation was in favour of continuing the Conference even after submission of the preliminary report to the Disarmament Commission, so that certain difficulties could be overcome.

Mr. Dean, the other co-Chairman, seems to be in full agreement with this suggestion. Perhaps this judicious decision will make it possible to submit another report before the next session of the United Nations General Assembly recording the promising results of the Conference, not only for the information of the General Assembly, but also in order to calm public opinion all over the world.

In order to attain these objectives, however, certain fundamental difficulties must be overcome; and if they are to be overcome, they must be tackled with decision and impartiality. In the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, the most genuine contribution that the eight countries which are not members of military alliances can make to the work of the Conference is, precisely, to undertake an objective and impartial analysis of the existing political difficulties and to submit disinterested suggestions for a solution to the great Powers and their allies.

I only wish to point to a difference in attitude which results, to be frank, from the difference between our responsibilities and those borne by the nations of the military groups. For my delegation considers that the responsibility of the eight countries is, first of all, to try to reduce the reciprocal resistances in order to facilitate and accelerate disarmament, whereas the great nuclear Powers and their allies also have another urgent and dangerous responsibility: that of ensuring that disarmament is carried out with the least possible risk for the countries undertaking it. I believe this difference in responsibilities explains the caution with which the nuclear Powers and their allies are acting, obliged, as they are, to take the fullest possible account of the interests they have to protect.

I should like to single out from the vast and complex picture of general and complete disarmament certain aspects which seem to us to be the most significant, and the immediate interest of which has been shown by the authoritative references made to them at recent meetings. I do this in order to show our interest and perhaps to submit a few suggestions, always in the same impartial and disinterested spirit.

First of all, I should like to deal with the questions of control and confidence, which seem to us to be closely connected. Many references have been made to a passage in the statement by the representative of Nigeria (ENDC/PV.31, page 6), who said that the three factors, disarmament, verification and confidence, are so interdependent that they form an indissoluble whole. I think that is true. An examination of the two draft treaties (ENDC/2, ENDC/30 and Corr.1) before us shows that as regards their modus operandi they are both divided into several stages, that is to say, into successive and periodic series of concrete measures to be put into effect. Thus both drafts have the same objective: general and complete disarmament. But we must note that this disarmament, although general and complete, can only be carried out materially and logically in a progressive and partial manner, that is to say by stages. Consequently, general disarmament is only a progressive and constant limitation of armaments until they are reduced to zero.

Circumstances dictate that armed States can only rid themselves of the burden of their armaments by difficult and time-consuming measures, because of imperative security reasons, technical possibilities of execution and even weighty economic considerations. If this is so and cannot be otherwise, it follows that in view of the special and, to some extent, novel aspects of nuclear weapons, the dangers which disarmament seeks to remove will not decrease in the first stages of disarmament. On the contrary, they may even increase. This means that if negotiating a disarmament treaty is delicate and difficult, the implementation of the treaty will be even more so - which is certainly not without precedent in diplomatic history. The risks inherent in carrying out disarmament are beyond any physical form of control, as was very aptly pointed out by the Swedish representative, when he said on 11 May:

"This, however, cannot be achieved without taking some risks. One hundred per cent security is hardly attainable." (ENDC/PV.35, page 29)

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Referring to that passage in the statement by our Swedish colleague, Mr. Zorin said, at the same meeting on 11 May:

"Yes, there is a certain risk. I full agree with what the representative of Sweden has said today to the effect that disarmament cannot be achieved without taking some risks." (ibid., page 61)

Mr. Dean, also speaking at the thirty-fifth meeting, expressed a similar idea when he said:

"Assurance to us means reasonable or adequate assurance, not foolproof assurance, which is never attainable anyway." (ibid., page 15)

If we look at things in this way, it seems difficult to deny that one of the most immediate problems of the disarmament process - I would even say one of the most concrete problems - is that of confidence. Some may think it paradoxical to class confidence as a concrete factor. Since it is a psychological attitude determined by such subjective, vague and unstable factors, how can it, in fact, be approached at the level of practical solutions? In reality, however, a closer study of the situation shows that this classification is not contrary either to logic or to common sense. Confidence is certainly a subjective attitude very like faith; but whereas faith is based on a certain tendency of the mind to accept unproven truths, confidence on the contrary, is based on experience, that is to say, on real and objective data. There is no doubt an inductive element in confidence, but the deductive element is just as strong and cannot be denied. We can have faith in something we do not know, but we have confidence only in what we know at least in part - but a substantial part.

For this reason, and with all due respect to those who hold this opinion, it may be considered that there is no good reason to believe that the question of disarmament should be separated from that of creating an atmosphere of increasing confidence between States and, especially, between the great Powers. In our view, moreover, this opinion is not in accordance with the basic principles adopted for our work in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961, or even with the allocation of the work of this Conference. For the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Joint Statement reads as follows:

"Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, ..." (ENDC/5, page 1)

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As to the allocation of our work, it should be remembered that the task of the Committee of the Whole is to work along the lines recommended in the passage I have just quoted from the Joint Statement. Moreover, in social life and even in the life of individuals, we constantly see that confidence goes hand-in-hand with the success of the most practical solutions. I do not think there is any need to dwell any further on this point, which is a matter of everyday life.

To revert to the questions under consideration, my delegation takes the view that it would be an unrealistic approach to our task to suppose that a disarmament treaty could be negotiated and implemented without creating a healthy atmosphere of firm trust between the great Powers, not before or after, but during the period of negotiations and implementation.

As I have said, confidence seems to us to be based mainly on the objective data of experience. A striking and not too remote example of this is provided by the atmosphere that prevailed between the Western Powers and the socialist countries when they were fighting together to defend the world against Nazi tyranny. The former ideological antagonism was deep-rooted and the circumstances in which the first phase of the war had taken place had done nothing to conceal it - rather the contrary. Nevertheless, it was enough for the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union to realize the interest that bound them together in defence of the same cause, for a degree of trust to be established between them, despite their negative experiences, that was sufficient to bring success in the tremendous task of crushing national socialism. When Prime Minister Churchill, in one of his famous parliamentary speeches, informed the world of the alliance between the United Kingdom and Soviet Union, everyone understood at once that a new experiment was beginning and confidence was born.

The problem today is to make people really aware that joint action by the great States is absolutely essential, in spite of all their ideological differences and the negative experiences of their recent relations, in order to win the new war, the greatest of all wars in history, the war against war, which can only be won by laying down all arms through general and complete disarmament. My delegation ventures to ask whether a common war against an aggressive power is not really less important than victory over all possibility of aggression. It also asks this: if it was possible to create awareness of a common task for the sake of war, why should not also be possible to create such awareness for the sake of peace. Confidence results from the creation of this awareness and it depends only on the powerful States, which can decide for peace or war. In the last analysis

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political power - from the historical viewpoint, of course - means nothing but a group of men whose co-ordinated will determines the course followed by peoples and States. Confidence depends today, as it did in the past, on the conscience and will of such groups of men in a small number of States. The representatives of the unarmed countries cannot create this confidence, but they know that the governments of the great Powers can do so. They know the responsibilities these men have to bear before history. It would be a grave mistake to regard confidence as a purely subjective, or shall we say abstract, factor. Far from it; it is a strictly concrete and objective thing, and without its material preservation, so to speak, we shall never be able to complete our task.

In this connexion I should like to quote a passage from the statement made by Mr. Zorin on 14 May, concerning this question of confidence. In his observation concerning

"the source of the changes for the better in relations among States that will be brought about by general and complete disarmament" (ENDC/PV.36 page 36) our Soviet colleague, if he will allow me to say so with all due respect, presented the problem in a way that seems to us to be incomplete. It is in all sincerity that we urge the importance of creating confidence as an essential factor, not only for implementing the treaty, but also for drafting it. This seems to me irrefutable, especially in view of the opinion generally held among the representatives of the two great nuclear Powers, to which I have already referred, that there will be an inevitable risk for both parties in the implementation of the treaty.

Now, if both parties agree in recognizing that there must inevitably be some degree of risk, how can we hope that they will solemnly undertake to accept this risk by an international treaty, unless the provisions of that treaty are backed by a sufficient measure of confidence to permit its execution? It is not, as some of our colleagues seem to think, a matter of securing a general easing of certain international tensions which have no direct connexion, or even no connexion at all, with the problem of disarmament. To speak plainly, it is not a matter of resolving conflicts, open or latent, such as those which exist today in South-East Asia, on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean and in the Caribbean sea. It is not a matter of devising an effective application, political or theoretical, of what is called the doctrine of peaceful coexistence of the two concepts of the State: that of the socialist world and that of the democratic world. It is a matter of being able to achieve here, in our work, in this treaty, something which was possible

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during the last war; that is to say, unity to defend the world, without which, I regret to say, it will not be possible to conclude the treaty successfully, as is desired by the United Nations and hoped by all the peoples of the world. These are the considerations my Delegation wished to put forward on a subject that many people may consider excessively general or even unrealistic - an opinion with which we take leave to disagree entirely.

As I have already said, the question of control is closely linked with the problem of confidence. It is the key to the whole system of disarmament; in every field, from every aspect and in every attempt, this is the obstacle. It is when control comes up that we hear these condemnations which, like a guillotine, decapitate the solutions proposed. It was this same guillotine which decapitated the eight-nation memorandum on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and it is still working efficiently in the negotiations on the treaty itself.

At our last informal meeting but one, I had occasion to ask the indulgence of the countries which have for years been at the centre of the negotiations on disarmament, in regard to the statements of representatives of countries newly admitted to the Conference, who are naturally less familiar with the subject. At the plenary meeting of 11 May (ENDC/PV.35) our Swedish colleague, Mr. Edberg, also stressed the lack of knowledge we are bound to show on certain technical matters. It is with the encouragement of such warnings, that I venture to take up the complicated problem of control.

First of all, I must say that Brazil favours a really effective system of control for the whole process of disarmament. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs made that clear in this very room, in the opening statement he made for our delegation at the Conference (ENDC/PV.3). Later, in my contacts with my government, I have several times received confirmation of this support for a system of effective control that will create confidence and facilitate the drafting and subsequent implementation of a treaty. Speaking with the frankness demanded of all of us by our duties here, I must say that in the opinion of my delegation the problem of control has not been given the persistent and patient attention it deserves. True, it is treated as a question of the greatest importance in both drafts; but in reality, in the deadlock caused by the conflicting proposals, very little has been done in the way of real negotiation or an effort to break the deadlock. Let us consider for example, the zonal inspection plan proposed



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by the United States. At least three of the eight delegations from non-aligned countries have recommended that this plan be studied more thoroughly to see whether it could serve as a basis for fruitful negotiations. The delegations of Nigeria, Sweden and Brazil made statements to that effect.

Mr. Edberg, in his interesting statement on 11 May, put three questions on this capital problem; it is highly significant that the answers given by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on 14 May and 15 May respectively (ENDC/PV.36, ENDC/PV.37), did not in fact quite correspond to the questions asked. Ambassador Zorin confined himself to repeating that his delegation could not accept the proposal, referring in a general way to the reasons given earlier, but without stating them. Now it so happens that the Swedish delegation's questions were directed precisely towards the possibility of making certain changes in the proposal, which might render it acceptable --- or rather, they were intended to suggest negotiation. Mr. Stelle, in turn, replied to one of the questions put by the Swedish representative, the fourth, by repeating the terms of the United States proposal. As to the other two questions, which also concerned the system of the zones, he preferred merely to refer to the Soviet refusal. Dealing with the same subject on 16 May (ENDC/PV.38), Mr. Godber dwelt mainly on the difficulties of the problem. These answers show that the time to negotiate on control does not yet seem to have come.

Then again, the positions do not seem to us to be clear, and it appears that we could extract nuances and variations from these debates which, if carefully explored, might yield results. For instance, the apparent incompatibility of the concepts of verification of disarmament and verification of armaments, which is always presented as the main point of disagreement, is perhaps not always so radical, if I understand the sense of the discussions aright.

Let us see what Mr. Zorin said on 11 May, referred to a question raised by Mr. Burns:

"Today Mr. Burns repeated the same question: do you include verification that there are no hidden weapons? Very well, if we include it, then what follows from this? Now I ask you: how do you envisage verifying the presence of these hidden weapons? ... What do you have in mind when you speak of verifying the presence of hidden weapons in the territory of a country of 22 million square kilometres?" (ENDC/PV.35, page 56).

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Before going into the question of how verification could be carried out, it will be well to look a little more closely at the position of the socialist countries on the substance of the matter, taking the statements made by their authorized representatives as a basis. It is possible to draw a distinction between the inspection of concealed armaments and the inspection of retained armaments. Both would remain after the destruction of armaments provided for in the treaty, but the retention of concealed armaments would be a violation of the treaty, whereas the retention of other existing weapons would be in keeping with its implementation.

On the basis of this difference, it could be argued that inspection of clandestine armaments is one thing, and inspection of retained armaments another; that one can be accepted without precluding rejection of the other. According to the texts I wish to refer to, if I have interpreted them correctly, I think the representatives of the socialist countries speak of the right to 100 per cent inspection only with regard to the search for clandestine armaments, without that entailing any obligation to accept a 100 per cent inspection of armaments retained under the treaty provisions. Indeed, Mr. Zorin, replying to Mr. Burns on 11 May, said:

"What do you have in mind when you speak of verifying the presence of hidden weapons" -- I stress the word hidden -- "in the territory of a country of 22 million square kilometres? How will you verify the presence of hidden weapons? Explain this Mr. Burns. You are a military man. Explain how you envisage searching for these hidden weapons?" (ibid.)

And on 16 May Mr. Naszkowski, our Polish colleague, said:

"... that it is materially impossible to apply, especially over vast territories, the principle of total control over weapons alleged to be concealed -- in other words, that it is impossible to control all the armaments of the other party in the absence of complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.38, pages 10-11)

That is to say that if the two possibilities -- verification of retained armaments and verification of clandestine armaments -- are assimilated, the Polish representative, if I have understood him correctly, says this control is impossible. Why? Because it would be control of all armaments, not only of clandestine armaments. But by negation, which is a figure in logic, if he considers it possible to control clandestine armaments 100 per cent, he puts himself in the position of accepting that control. I do not think that the Polish delegation

(Mr. de Mello-Franco, Brazil)

finds my conclusion very welcome, but it seems to me to be logical. Agreement must be reached on it, and it is precisely on this point that I wish to make the following comments.

To revert to the system of questions, which has produced such good results since the representative of Sweden initiated it, I too should like to ask the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland whether our interpretation is correct and, if so, whether they think it possible to establish a system for verifying the existence of clandestine armaments, which is separate from the system for verifying retained armaments? I mean, of course, 100 per cent verification in both cases.

Amid all these uncertainties, only two things seem sure: the United States has proposed a system of total verification by zones, which the Soviet Union refuses; and the Soviet Union has proposed a system of total verification of equipment destroyed, which the United States refuses.

Both the systems proposed are at the same time partial and total. The United States inspection is total in respect of armaments and partial in respect of the territory on which it would be carried out. The Soviet inspection is total in respect of armaments destroyed and partial in respect of those retained. The two systems are incompatible, however, and faced with this incompatibility there is no denying that negotiations for a disarmament treaty have reached a deadlock. Now it is not merely a treaty on disarmament that the United Nations has asked us to draw up, but, as is perfectly clear from the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961, a treaty provided with a system of strict and effective international control. Consequently, refusal to accept such a control system would mean that the treaty would not be viable and that our work at Geneva had failed.

We may therefore conclude that it is absolutely essential and urgent to negotiate with patience, even with obstinacy, in order to find an acceptable solution of the problem of control. Considered rationally, this problem is difficult to solve because of an initial contradiction which is inherent in it and cannot be concealed. This contradiction can be stated as follows: control cannot be based on confidence, for if there was total confidence control would not be necessary. But conversely, control cannot be carried out without confidence, for if there was no confidence at all control would be impossible. In order to solve this riddle we must negotiate on the basis of a system which can be put into effect and which at the same time will promote confidence.

In this connexion, I should like to recall an important piece of information which was given to us by Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, at the meeting on 16 May. Speaking on the problem of control, Mr. Godber said:

"We, for our part, in the United Kingdom have made a fairly exhaustive study of the problems of verification and we shall be ready to discuss with our colleagues in considerable detail what can be done and what cannot be done." (ENDC/PV.38, p.39)

And later, he said:

"I myself have in the past proposed that it would be useful in certain circumstances to think in terms of sub-committees; this might be one of the avenues where that thought could be followed." (ibid.)

At the same meeting on 16 May, Mr. Zorin, replying to the comments of our Canadian colleague, Mr. Burns, repeated his appeal for really convincing data on the possibilities of carrying out control by direct inspection. So far, however, no such data have been submitted to us. The Brazilian delegation does not wish to deny their existence. It is merely obliged to note that so far, no really convincing proposal has been submitted to the Conference on the application of control by direct inspection in face of the material, and even logical, problems and difficulties which would arise, according to the repeated statements of the Soviet delegation.

Consequently, I cannot very well see why we should struggle with the political difficulties of the problem here, while one of the best qualified delegations of this Conference -- I refer to that of the United Kingdom -- examines the technical aspects in a small committee. We consider that such studies should not be confined to one country, because their subsequent reconsideration by the Conference would cause waste of time. Moreover, the unilateral origin of the conclusions would make it impossible to avoid certain political difficulties.

We think it would be advisable, therefore, to set up, under the auspices of the Conference, a specialized technical body to study control problems and to submit suggestions on the subject in due course. This solution seems to us to be preferable to that of entrusting these studies to a small group of delegations, since the results of the work, when submitted to the Conference, might need more time for due consideration, not to mention the fact that their unilateral origin might cause the other party to make reservations. We urge that there is no reason to exclude the technical problems from a joint study, seeing that the political problems, which are obviously of capital importance, are being jointly negotiated.

(Mr. de Mello-Franco, Brazil)

I realize, moreover, that little inclination has been shown in the United Nations to consider the problem of disarmament from the technical point of view. I believe Mr. Macmillan, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, made a proposal to this effect at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, and that proposal was not adopted. The eight-nation memorandum, which also put the technical side first, has been shelved. The same applies to a similar proposal made here by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Cavalletti. So as I have few illusions about the existing willingness to undertake a technical study of the various problems I shall make no formal proposal; I merely make this suggestion, which cannot commit anyone, even if it is accepted.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): In the statements made at the thirty-eighth meeting by the representatives of the Western Powers there are certain points on which the Polish delegation wishes to state its opinion.

In the first place, our attention was claimed by the assertion made by Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, that the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament is an attractive measure, but, allegedly, an unrealistic one proposed for propaganda purposes.

Mr. Godber will bear with me if I suggest that this is strange reasoning indeed. The mere fact that this proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is put forward by a State heavily armed with missiles, which are its main defence, proves that the proposal can only be based on a sincere desire to carry out effective disarmament which will guarantee all States the same conditions of security. Can we conceive that a State would declare itself willing to scrap its most powerful weapon for propaganda purposes? If that is propaganda, we must express the hope that there will be as much of it as possible and that the Western Powers will not refrain from it either.

It is only the complete elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, at the very beginning of disarmament, that can form the foundation for a concept of disarmament based on a rational evaluation of the nature of modern weapons. The idea of gradually making partial reductions in the armaments of States while keeping their present military organization unchanged, cannot ensure quick elimination of the danger of nuclear war. While such a programme was

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

being carried out, and until the very end of the disarmament process, States would live in the shadow of the nuclear bomb and every decision before the next reduction would be taken in the knowledge that nuclear bombs and their delivery vehicles remained in the arsenals of other countries. Can we, in these circumstances, speak of the continuity and effectiveness of disarmament? And can we agree with Mr. Godber when he asserts that the exiguity of the disarmament measures provided for in stage I of the United States plan give it advantages over the Soviet plan?

In their statements, the Western representatives often try to focus the Committee's attention on problems that are only of secondary importance in our negotiations. The impression is created that we are deliberating here not in order to formulate disarmament measures quickly and realistically, but in order to discover and catalogue all the theoretical possibilities of violating a treaty.

Much is made of the fears felt for the fate of the treaty, by speaking of the concealment of a certain quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles after the Soviet proposals for stage I have been carried out. It seems that we were wrong in saying, in a previous statement, that no one in this room could still believe in the suitcase theory. Although he has said that he is not concerned about the theory of nuclear bombs being carried in suitcases, Mr. Godber repeated the statements about the possibility of civilian means of transport and equipment being used to deliver nuclear bombs.

In our opinion, these statements do not stand up to criticism. There is no doubt that the adaptation of a sufficient number of civilian vehicles to carry nuclear weapons, in order to strike a blow at an enemy, would require extensive conversions and technical operations that could not escape the notice of the inspectors on the sites for the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, in industrial undertakings and on the launching sites for nuclear missiles. It would also be necessary to build launching pads, launching sites or ports, which would certainly not be like the proverbial needle in a haystack, and such a concentration of new nuclear weapon vehicles should be easy to detect.

While speaking of the question of control, I should also like to reply to Mr. Helle-Franco, the Brazilian representative, who was good enough to quote from the statement I made a few days ago. It is true that we have a different approach to the problem of controlling concealed armaments and retained armaments. We are in favour of 100 per cent control of armaments to be destroyed and, consequently, of control of possible concealed armaments; but that does not mean that control should be extended to retained armaments.

On Wednesday we listened with interest to the statement made by the Canadian representative (ENDC/PV.38). However, Mr. Burns also placed the main emphasis on possibilities of a disarmament treaty being violated by the parties, as his United Kingdom colleague had done. With all due respect to his wide experience in international affairs, particularly in the field of arbitration in the United Nations, I should like to point out a few contradictions in his comments.

There is no doubt that Mr. Burns is right in saying that general and complete disarmament is something entirely new and unprecedented in the history of mankind. But the conclusion drawn from this thesis is that we should be all the more suspicious of our treaty partners, and safeguard ourselves in every minute detail against any possible violation of its obligations by the other party. We are given a number of examples from the past showing how often international agreements have been violated, and how, through lack of goodwill, States have refused to open those doors of which Mr. Burns told us, in order to allow verification of the implementation of agreements. We are firmly convinced that examples from history cannot be properly applied to an agreement on general and complete disarmament, because, as Mr. Burns himself said, it will be an entirely new and unprecedented event in the history of mankind.

This event will create precisely that atmosphere of confidence, the importance of which was described just now by the representative of Brazil. Of course, confidence will be built up gradually during the successive stages of disarmament; but the more rapid and effective the disarmament measures are, the more solid will be the foundation of this confidence. What must be stressed, above all, is that the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament will introduce a new rule of international life, to which there is nothing equivalent in any previous treaty. In a world without arms or armies, other laws will prevail than in a world armed to the teeth. Why should we assume a priori that the States which take such a fundamental decision and lay down new rules for international relations are bound to violate the treaty?

There is yet another element: the well-understood interest of each party. For what is prompting us to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament is, precisely, the fact that we are aware of the instability of the present balance and of all the dangers that follow from it. It is, precisely, the well understood interest of every State and every people that execution of the general disarmament programme will serve --- their interest in securing forever that state of peace and security brought about by general disarmament, which will be the best guarantee of the genuineness of the treaty.

In saying this we are not, of course, trying to deny the importance of an effective system of international control, or of possible sanctions by the Security Council against any State violating the treaty. But I repeat that the principal guarantee is the interest of the peoples, who once they have set out on a road that is without fear and without war, will never wish to leave it.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before I pass on to what the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to say at what I would describe as almost the closing stage of the discussion on the first stage of disarmament, I should like to point out to the Brazilian representative in connexion with his interesting statement, which will be studied by the Soviet delegation, that he expressed an idea in this statement which causes us serious misgivings. Mr. Mello-Franco said rather graphically that "the ... guillotine ... has beheaded the eight-nation memorandum" and went on to say that the same guillotine of control may behead the disarmament process itself. That is how I noted down his remark according to the interpretation. This figure of speech can be understood in the light of the subsequent explanation given by the representative of Brazil that the whole point of the matter was that the technical aspects of control had not been worked out.

In this connexion I am bound to say that the actual example adduced by the Brazilian representative in regard to the eight-nation memorandum seems to me to refute this point of view. Why, indeed, was the eight-nation memorandum beheaded? Have there not been all sorts of technical studies hitherto? There has been any amount of them. Have we not discussed a great variety of alternatives of control and so forth? And when the eight-nation memorandum was submitted, as was explained by the representative of Sweden and the representatives of the other countries which participated in drawing up this memorandum, they proposed, as it were, a scientific and technical approach to the solution of this question.

The Soviet Union accepted this new approach. Why, then, did the Western Powers not accept it? Not because the technical aspects or something else had not been studied. All this had been studied and re-studied a score of times. They had no political wish to adopt a new position and to give up their old position. They had no political wish to adopt a decision on the discontinuance of tests. That is the gist of the matter. That is why it has not been possible to adopt this memorandum as a basis, although one of the sides has adopted it as a basis from the very beginning. Disputes and talks are still going on round and about this memorandum and attempts are being made to involve us in various discussions on points of detail, whereas the basic principles of this memorandum are not accepted. They are not accepted, not because there has been no technical study of the control system, but because there is no political



wish to adopt a new position, give up the old one and really put a stop to testing. That is the heart of the matter.

Therefore, when the representative of Brazil says that the guillotine of control may behead disarmament itself, I can agree with him in the sense that when questions of control are pushed to the forefront, this may have the effect of beheading disarmament. That is quite correct. When there is no wish to reach agreement on disarmament measures, the best way to evade it is to push the control system to the forefront and say: "We are not in agreement on questions of control", whereas in fact there is no agreement on the basic disarmament measures. The representative of Brazil, so far as I remember, at the very beginning of our work reminded us of the bitter experience of the League of Nations and told us that the League of Nations became bogged down in endless technical discussions of various categories of armaments and so on and so forth.

But it is just the same here. Discussion of technical questions of control will not solve anything, if we have not solved the main questions of disarmament itself - the disarmament measures themselves. It will not solve anything, and it will be a sheer waste of time. It will merely divert us from settling the main differences confronting us. That is the comment which I wanted to make immediately, although I am bound to say that a whole number of important considerations regarding the question of control and the question of confidence certainly deserve attention, and they will be carefully studied by the Soviet delegation. Now I should like to pass on to the main subject of my statement today.

A broad discussion has taken place in the Committee on stage I of general and complete disarmament. We have had an opportunity to discuss thoroughly and compare the existing proposals concerning stage I. We have listened to explanations in regard to the whole range of measures contemplated in these proposals. Questions of a general nature were raised, as well as questions in respect of details. As a result there is every justification for saying that the Committee now has before it a fairly definite picture of what is proposed by the sides and what the difference between them are. It will hardly be of any use to go further into details at the present stage, since this will yield little in the way of elucidating the main questions. Moreover, there may even be a negative effect in the sense that there is a loss of perspective when differences on minor

questions of a secondary nature prevent us from seeing the basic differences, which have to be settled if we are to move forward.

It should be stressed that a number of delegations have already recognized the need to complete the discussion of stage I and to pass on to consideration of the measures for the subsequent stages. This is evident, in particular, from the statements made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom at the meeting of the Committee on 16 May (ENDC/PV.38).

Discussion of the Soviet Union and United States proposals for the first stage of disarmament has shown that there are differences. These became particularly evident at the informal meeting of 17 May. The Soviet Union desires, and I think it is also the desire of the other members of the Committee, to achieve agreement and to eliminate differences. However, in order to enable us to find ways and means to eliminate differences, we must be quite clear in our own minds as to what the substance of these differences is and which of the differences are the most important.

The most serious differences arose in regard to the nature and scope of the disarmament measures in the first stage. It is now obvious that the differences on questions of control and some other matters are of secondary importance. We would be lacking in sincerity if we failed to recognize that questions of control, as has become evident in the course of the discussion, are secondary matters and the differences in regard to them arise to a large extent from the differences in connexion with the crucial questions concerning disarmament measures. After the discussion we have had, it is hardly possible for anyone to deny that the nature and scope of control are directly dependent on the nature and scope of the disarmament measures.

All members of the Committee agree on the need for control over the implementation of disarmament. But so far we have no agreement as to what kind of disarmament we deem necessary in the first stage. Apparently there are differences on the question of what kind of control should be established. But even to specify these differences - to say nothing of their elimination - will only be possible after we have determined what kind of disarmament we shall have. Thus, the very logic of agreement on general and complete disarmament and, I would say, the very logic of life itself, prompts us to devote our attention first and foremost to eliminating the differences in regard to the first stage of

disarmament. Once these differences are settled, it will not be particularly difficult to find a common platform for solving all other questions.

In order that our efforts to achieve agreement on stage I of disarmament may be fruitful, it is necessary in the first place to elucidate what the substance of the differences consists in. In order to understand the basis of these differences, we must answer the question of what we wish to secure from stage I of disarmament. Do we or do we not wish to remove the greatest danger of our time - the threat of a nuclear war breaking out? Do we intend to give a powerful start to the implementation of disarmament, or are we thinking of limiting ourselves to timid steps, half-measures, which are incapable of creating that impetus to the implementation of disarmament, the necessity of which was so eloquently stressed by the representative of India, Mr. Lall?

I believe that the reply of all the members of the Committee will be: yes, we wish to establish a solid foundation for general and complete disarmament and we wish to rid our States and our peoples of the threat of a nuclear disaster. How can this wish be translated into reality?

There are two possible ways to avert the threat of a nuclear war and to clear the highway leading to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of relations of confidence and friendship among peoples. These two ways are: either to eliminate nuclear weapons in the first stage or to render their use impossible. There is no third way, and no one has so far named it. This is the real state of affairs, and we must look reality squarely in the face if we desire to bring about general and complete disarmament and to create a world without wars and without armaments.

I have repeatedly pointed out at previous meetings why we cannot follow the path of eliminating nuclear weapons in stage I. This path is barred by the position of the Western Powers, who are not prepared - and I shall say nothing as to whether their motives have any grounds - to agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the disarmament process, namely, in stage I. In the circumstances created as a result of this, only one possible way is open, that is the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government has proposed this way in its draft treaty. We note that it has certain advantages since - as is recognized by everyone, including the Western Powers - it is much easier to verify measures relating to the technically complex and often unwieldy installations required for delivering

nuclear weapons to their targets than to verify measures relating to the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves.

I repeat that the main task confronting us is to eliminate as quickly as possible the threat of a nuclear war. Not a single responsible statesman and politician will dare deny the reality and urgency of this task. We cannot avoid fulfilling this task first and foremost.

The appeals, which we have heard from the Western representatives, not to hurry, not to lay down too great tasks - as Mr. Godber said, not to "overload the first stage" - are tantamount to telling the peoples of the world to agree to go on living under the threat of a nuclear war in order to spare us, the statesmen, the need to exert greater efforts. That is precisely the situation. At stake, on the one hand, is the question of the peoples' lives and, on the other hand, the question of whether or not to exert greater efforts, to summon up the will and the courage. This is the dilemma you have to escape from.

We have before us two proposals on general and complete disarmament, and to assess to what extent they correspond to the tasks brought to the fore by life itself, we must determine, first of all, whether they lead to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war in stage I.

If we apply the yardstick suggested by life itself, does the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I fulfil the task of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war? Any unbiased person will reply that it does. When there are no means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, the weapons cannot be used against States, towns, settlements or industrial targets. This is an undoubted and indisputable fact, and it cannot be shaken by arguments intended for simpletons that nuclear weapons for serious military operations can be delivered in a fishing boat, sports aircraft and so forth.

Let us now put the question whether this task is fulfilled by the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I, not to mention the transfer of 50 tons of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, when 70 per cent of the nuclear weapon vehicles and immense stock-piles of manufactured nuclear weapons will remain? Everyone who has not lost the ability to think sanely will say that it does not. It is an obvious truth that as long as States retain at their disposal the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons themselves, the possibility of a nuclear conflict

is bound to remain. One can easily understand the embarrassment of the United States Delegation and its inability to explain how its proposal would ensure the prevention of a nuclear conflict in stage I and in all the subsequent stages of disarmament. The United States Delegation is unable to give a satisfactory answer while it adheres to the position of its present proposal.

That is the essence of the main difference between the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States. I put the question to the members of the Committee: in what direction should we eliminate this difference? In the direction of saving the peoples from the threat of a nuclear war at the very beginning of disarmament or in the direction of maintaining this threat indefinitely? I think that hardly anyone would choose the latter direction. All who are really interested in securing a lasting peace will choose the former.

Attention has also been drawn in the Committee to the major peaceful and military problems confronting mankind as a result of the development of science and technology. We all realize that the technical achievements in creating powerful rockets, artificial earth-satellites and space vehicles are fraught with the possibility of their being used to the detriment of the interests of peace. Already now we are pondering on what must be done to avert the appearance of a new threat to mankind. How can we ensure wide co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space and guard against the possibility of outer space being used for military purposes? This in its turn leads us to the question: is it possible to have the assurance that outer space will serve only the peaceful needs of mankind, when military rockets remain at the disposal of States and work is being carried out on the further improvement of these rockets?

The answer is self-evident. No one can give such an assurance. Consequently, if we wish to lay down a reliable foundation for the peaceful exploration of outer space, we must put a stop to the military trend in the use of outer space. This can be reliably achieved only through the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including military rockets. With a percentage reduction of delivery vehicles it is impossible to have the assurance that only peaceful scientific apparatus and space vehicles will be launched into outer space. It is impossible to have the assurance that new and still more powerful military rockets will not be constructed. Furthermore, a percentage reduction, as was clearly shown in the statement of the United States representative on 16 May (ENDC/PV.38), implies the military use of outer

space, if only in the form of testing the operating condition of military rockets.

In what direction should we seek to eliminate this difference? In the direction of the proposals, which provide for the destruction of all military rocket equipment, or in the direction of the proposals which would keep military rockets at the disposal of States and, furthermore, allow the further testing of military rockets and, consequently, their improvement? I think that there can be no two answers to this question. A solution to the problem must be sought through the complete elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including all military rocket equipment, and the establishment of control and co-operation in the use of space rockets for peaceful purposes.

Discussion of the proposals of the two sides for stage I of disarmament has revealed differences also in regard to the amount of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. These differences must be overcome if agreement is to be reached. But how are these differences to be overcome?

To find a correct solution to this question, we must come to a conclusion as to whether or not we wish to alleviate substantially the burden of armaments now on the shoulders of the peoples. Do we or do we not wish to diminish to the utmost the possibility of military conflicts, including so-called minor wars?

I believe that, if not all the members of the Committee, at least the majority will answer these questions in the affirmative. And this is quite natural, since a substantial alleviation of the armaments burden and the greatest possible reduction of the risk of military conflicts are in the national interests of the majority of States. In this case vast opportunities would be opened up for achieving a rapid development of national economies, for increasing the well-being of the peoples and for rendering even more extensive economic and technical assistance to other States. It follows from all this that it is essential to provide for a drastic reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in stage I.

This conclusion suggests to us in what direction we should seek to eliminate the differences on the question of the reduction of armed forces and armaments. The Soviet Union's proposal for stage I of disarmament providing for the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to the level of 1,700,000 men and for the reduction of conventional armaments to the

amount strictly necessary for equipping these levels, is undoubtedly better calculated to remove the burden of armaments and diminish the possibility of a military conflict than the United States' proposal, which provides for considerably higher levels of armed forces and conventional armaments. The Soviet Union's proposal on this question is all the more calculated to answer the purpose of overcoming the differences, in that it helps to remove the apprehensions repeatedly expressed by the Western Powers about the Soviet Union having an alleged advantage in these types of armaments. Therefore, there is every reason to say that we have taken steps to meet the Western Powers in this respect.

During the discussion of the proposals relating to stage I of disarmament, differences appeared on the subject of the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories. The Soviet Delegation and a number of other delegations consider it necessary to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the same time as foreign military bases in alien territories and to withdraw foreign troops from such territories. In their proposals the Western Powers not only put off the elimination of foreign military bases to the latter stages of disarmament, but do not wish at all to lay down any clear obligations in regard to the elimination of foreign military bases.

In what direction, then, should we make efforts to resolve the differences on this question? In order to choose the right direction, it is necessary to understand what purpose foreign military bases are intended to serve and what the real consequences of their establishment are. None of the representatives, who defended the retention of foreign military bases, was able to refute the fact that foreign military bases in alien territories located a thousand miles from the country to which these bases belong, are by their nature strong-points for attack and aggression.

Equally unquestionable is the conclusion that the presence of foreign military bases in alien territories increases suspicion and distrust in relations between States. It is also known that as a result of establishing foreign military bases there is a risk of aggravating and extending a military conflict. Blows can be delivered not only from bases but will inevitably be directed against the bases themselves. This causes legitimate fear and concern among the peoples of the States in whose territories there are foreign military bases. If one is

to be candid, it must be recognized that such bases are one of the serious factors undermining confidence between States.

Can we agree to a treaty, which would leave intact the hotbeds of potential aggression and the sources spreading the poison of mistrust? This suggests to us the direction in which we should make our efforts, namely towards reaching agreement on the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories and on the withdrawal of foreign troops from these territories.

Can such an agreement be reached? We are convinced that it can, if we are guided by goodwill and the desire to abide by the principles agreed upon between us concerning the equal position of States in the course of disarmament.

The Soviet Union proposes that foreign military bases should be eliminated at the same time as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. With the simultaneous implementation of these measures, the renunciation by the Soviet Union of the most perfected means of delivery of nuclear weapons - rockets, which are the main basis of its defence - is compensated by the elimination of foreign military bases directed against the Soviet Union and its allies. On the other hand, the elimination of foreign military bases, on which the United States relies, is compensated by the elimination of the most powerful means of delivering a nuclear blow - rockets, in which field the Soviet Union has achieved successes that are universally known. Moreover, the substantial reduction of armed forces and the limitation of conventional armaments to the amount strictly necessary for equipping these forces without retaining any reserves, gives an additional guarantee to the Western Powers that in the process of implementing stage I they will not suffer any detriment from the point of view of ensuring their security.

In contrast to the proposal of the Soviet Union, the proposal of the United States does not ensure the equal position of States in the course of the implementation of disarmament. In proposing a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery in stage I, the United States provides for neither the elimination nor the reduction of foreign military bases in alien territories. The disturbance of the balance of the sides which obviously flows from this is made all the greater by the fact that the United States at the same time puts forward demands for such control as would enable it to find out all about the defence system of the Soviet Union and other countries. The retention of the greater part of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons themselves increases the danger of a surprise attack being carried out, after those who



contemplate such an attack have obtained precise information regarding the location of the means of defence of the other side.

The discussion of the proposals of the sides concerning stage I of disarmament has shown that there are differences in regard to the time limits for the implementation of this stage and for the programme of general and complete disarmament as a whole. Of course, these differences will also have to be overcome in the course of further negotiations.

In what direction should we seek to settle the differences on the question of time-limits? Should it be in the direction of a rapid implementation of general and complete disarmament or in the direction of a slow movement at a snail's pace? We have heard the advice of the United Kingdom representative that we should not be in a hurry, should not show any haste. However, if we put this question to the peoples of the world, there can be no doubt about the answer we would get. The feelings and desires of the peoples in this regard, wherever they may be, in the United Kingdom or in India, in the Soviet Union or the United States, or in any other country, are widely known. They ardently desire to have an end put as quickly as possible to the arms race and the creation of means of mass destruction. They ardently long for the day to come as quickly as possible when the horizon will no longer be darkened by war clouds. Have we the right to ignore this desire of the peoples and to advocate the need to move slowly at a minimum pace towards disarmament? Of course not. It is precisely the will of the peoples which has brought us here to Geneva. Therefore, it is our direct duty towards the peoples to reach agreement on the speediest possible implementation of disarmament. Perhaps someone will have to toil and sweat in bringing about disarmament, but does this bear any comparison with the danger hanging over the peoples or with the sweat which is being squeezed out of them by the arms race?

If one takes as a starting point the general interests of peace and the interests of the peoples, it will become clear that these interests are best served by the proposal of the Soviet Union providing for the implementation of the first stage within a short but realistic time limit. We have even less right to delay the implementation of disarmament since we have already had practical experience in cutting down armed forces and the war industry after the Second World War.

It has been asserted here that the unilateral reduction of armed forces and the destruction of armaments after the war are something altogether different from the reduction of armed forces and the destruction of armaments under an international agreement. However, no one can answer the question why more time should be needed for the demobilization of soldiers under an international agreement or why it should take longer to scrap a cannon under an international agreement. The delay in the implementation of disarmament, in particular, in stage I, was linked with the establishment of a disarmament organization and the adoption of measures for the maintenance of peace.

But those who say this do not see the serious contradiction into which they fall. Can such measures be called measures for the maintenance of peace, if they are put forward as a reason for delaying the implementation of measures which are precisely calculated to do away with the possibility of war breaking out, namely measures of general and complete disarmament? As for the reference to the necessity of slowing down the implementation of disarmament in view of the need to establish control, do the speakers really think that it would be necessary to establish a control organization equal or almost equal in its unwieldiness to the existing armed forces of the largest States? Moreover, the setting up of the control apparatus and the recruitment of staff can and must be carried out even before the beginning of the disarmament process itself, after the signing of the treaty, and cannot prolong the period of implementation of the measures of specific disarmament stages.

The examination of the proposals of the sides in regard to stage I of disarmament has revealed differences as to whether the treaty should contain firm and definite obligations or only general provisions not binding the States and not laying them under any specific obligations. The Soviet Union is in favour of laying down the specific obligations of States for stage I of disarmament, as well as for the whole programme, and definite time-limits for their implementation. The proposal of the United States contains reservations, which whittle away the obligations of States and give them the nature of general wishes.

In order not to make an unsubstantiated statement, I would remind you that the discussion at the last meeting clearly showed that although the United States talks of eliminating nuclear weapons, its proposals do not ensure this elimination unconditionally and do not ensure the prohibition of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, we have even heard the United States representative speak about

the possibility of equipping the armed forces of the United Nations with nuclear weapons. It is difficult to imagine how one can speak of a peaceful world - this is a phrase the United States is fond of using - and at the same time provide for the retention of weapons of mass destruction.

In what direction should we seek the solution? I am convinced that there can be no two opinions on this score. It is obvious that if we reduce the matter to general provisions not binding anyone to anything, then there can be no treaty on disarmament. An international treaty implies the laying down of specific and clearly defined obligations both in respect of the scope of the measures and in respect of the time-limits for their implementation. For this reason it is impossible to agree with the conditions governing transition from one stage to another contained in the United States proposal, which create a real danger that disarmament might be stopped at the end of stage I. Any permanent member of the control council or the Security Council may, at his own discretion and even without being accountable to anyone, delay the implementation of stage I and, moreover, prevent transition to stage II of disarmament. In fact, this means that the duration of stage I becomes indefinite, and at the same time the obligations of States also become indefinite. In other words, the United States wishes to give States the freedom to violate the disarmament treaty. Under the United States plan, a State frustrating the implementation of disarmament would bear no responsibility, not even a moral one; it would be protected against this by the provisions of the treaty.

What I have said refers to the main differences which have emerged in the discussion of the proposals on disarmament measures. There are, of course, differences on the question of control. But these differences, if we view them in the right perspective, are of a subordinate nature.

How can the differences on the question of control be overcome? Is it possible to do this separately from real disarmament measures or not? I am convinced that no one will dispute the conclusion that in solving the question of control it is necessary to stand on the ground of real facts and take into account all aspects of the security of States. Indeed, can one expect States to give their consent to the establishment of a control which would create a threat to their security?

The solution of the problem of control is not sought by those who, while stressing in every way the importance of control, do not at the same time ensure a realistic basis for its solution and for feasible measures of control, but by those who propose such control and disarmament measures as facilitate the establishment of effective international control without detriment to the national security of States.

Let us imagine for a moment whether a State which, owing to a number of circumstances is compelled to rely on rockets as its basic means of defence, can allow control over and inspection of its rocket installations, rockets and boosters, if the threat of a nuclear attack by the other side is not removed? I shall not give the answer in detail. It is obvious. Of course it cannot.

There is no need to prove that a reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons by any percentage or proportion not only does not remove the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war but cannot even limit the scale of a nuclear war, in the event of such a war breaking out, since with the existing development of nuclear weapons and the use of powerful megaton bombs tremendous damage can be inflicted on any State. On the other hand, the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, together with the simultaneous dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territories, removes the danger of a nuclear attack from any quarter. Such a solution of the problem facilitates the achievement of agreement on the 100 per cent verification of the 100 per cent elimination of the means of delivery and military bases. It thereby provides a real basis for a genuine solution of the question of effective control over disarmament and not over armaments.

When control questions were being discussed, the question of verification of the remaining armaments was also raised. What is the result of this discussion? The most important result is that it has shown the complete lack of grounds for raising the question of verification of the remaining armaments. In their statements, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western Powers were forced to recognize the practical impossibility of carrying out verification of the remaining armaments and that, in fact, it was not necessary for the purpose of ensuring the compliance of States with their disarmament obligations. The earlier demand for complete verification without exception of all armaments and armed forces has now been withdrawn by the authors themselves who realized that it was unfounded. That is why they are now putting

forward the so-called sampling or zonal method of inspection. However, this inspection likewise does not remove the danger of its being used to the detriment of the interests of States, since here again we have the basically wrong approach of control over armaments and not over disarmament. In carrying out zonal inspection, there may also take place an ascertainment of military information which is of decisive importance for ensuring security in conditions where the possibility of carrying out a nuclear attack with the remaining means of delivery of nuclear weapons is retained.

On the other hand, the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and foreign bases in stage I removes the danger of a nuclear attack and facilitates the task of control and verification of the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations agreed upon for this stage.

In the course of the discussion in the Committee the question of the need for confidence was raised. The representative of Brazil spoke about this today in some detail and, in my view, very convincingly. On this question there seem to be no differences. All members of the Committee recognize the need for strengthening confidence. Although there is a consensus of opinion in this regard, there are certain differences as to how confidence should be built up. Consequently in this regard also some work remains to be done. Once again I repeat the question - in what direction should our thoughts be turned in this connexion?

We believe that the implementation of disarmament and the strengthening of confidence between States should go hand in hand. If we desire that the treaty should strengthen confidence, we should ensure that it meets certain requirements so that it would contribute to the growth of confidence between States; the treaty itself must inspire confidence. It is obvious that one cannot expect confidence in obligations which we are not sure will be complied with, in obligations which amount to no more than general pious wishes. One cannot have confidence in a treaty with vague and nebulous obligations. This brings us back again to the question whether the treaty should contain definite obligations both in respect of disarmament measures and time-limits or whether it should be a collection of provisions which are not binding.

This is one aspect of the matter. A no less important aspect is how we are to start building up confidence. In this connexion, the question arises whether we can expect to restore confidence between States in a situation where

the threat of nuclear war still exists and when the whole policy of the Western Powers is based on the so-called theory of deterrents. Consequently, in order to solve the problem of restoring confidence on a sound basis, it is necessary from the very start of disarmament to put an end to the threat of the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out. In the present circumstances the surest way to achieve this is by eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons and dismantling foreign bases in alien territories. Those who really desire the strengthening of confidence between States cannot but recognize this obvious truth.

As I have already pointed out, the discussion which we have had has revealed the existence of considerable differences between the sides on questions connected with the first stage of disarmament. The Soviet delegation believes that it is essential to redouble our efforts in order to find a way to overcome the differences which have emerged. I have expressed the views of the Soviet delegation regarding the direction in which we should try to overcome the differences.

In defining this direction, the Soviet delegation was not guided by the interests of polemics but by a sober assessment of the requirements of the present time. It is our duty to find a solution to the differences which have arisen. Can we find a way out of the situation if we limit our discussion to stage I only, and we delay the discussion of the two remaining stages of disarmament? Of course not. In this connexion, I should like to remind you of the considerations concerning the possibility of transferring measures from one stage to another, which have been expressed by several delegations. What follows from this? It follows that between the stages there are deep inner links and therefore, in order to elucidate the possibilities of overcoming the differences which have arisen, we must take a look at stage II and then stage III of disarmament. This is yet another consideration in support of the view that we should pass on to a discussion of the proposals put forward by the sides concerning stage II of disarmament.

The Soviet delegation considers that at the present stage of the work of the Committee it would be useful to ask the co-Chairmen, as was suggested by the representative of Bulgaria, to try, with due regard to the exchange of views which has taken place in the Committee, to bring closer the positions on the questions relating to stage I of disarmament. The Soviet delegation is prepared to enter into such negotiations with the United States delegation.

Meanwhile, at the plenary meetings of the Committee, we should start discussion of the articles of the Soviet draft treaty relating to stage II of disarmament and then those relating to stage III and the corresponding provisions of the United States document. Such a discussion would facilitate further clarification of the positions of the sides, which would undoubtedly be of considerable importance in our efforts to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with care to the speeches made this morning, which have covered a variety of topics.

I would like first to make one immediate comment on the proposal made by our Soviet colleague at the end of his speech, that we should proceed forthwith to discuss stages II and III. He referred to this also in his opening remarks and did me the honour of bringing my name in as being in support of this observation. I am always happy to be found to be in league with Mr. Zorin, but on this occasion I think perhaps I ought to clarify the degree of association that we have on this. It was my statement on 16 May to which he was referring, when I said:

"I should like to give some more thought to the question of how much longer it would be fruitful for us to discuss the first stage in this present phase of our discussions. But I quite agree that we shall have to look at the further stages in due course and perhaps go through them all before we shall be able to arrive at firm decisions."

(ENDC/PV.38, page 31)

I think that, with the greatest latitude in the world, one could not say that was a firm endorsement of what our Soviet colleague was just proposing. As I indicated then, I am quite willing that we should go forward but I would have thought that at the moment it was a trifle premature. However, I hope our co-Chairmen can discuss this; I think this is the best way. At the moment I myself am not quite happy about the idea that we should immediately move on to a discussion of the next stage.

I would touch also on the point that Mr. Zorin made at the beginning of his remarks when he was commenting on one aspect of the very clear and penetrating statement that we had from our Brazilian colleague this morning. I hope to come back to that statement in due course. Mr. Zorin did say at one stage that he had serious doubts about this whole question of the technical aspects of

control. In relation to the nuclear test ban treaty he said that we had as many technical studies as we could wish for. It is true, we had. We had the 1958 experts' report (E & P/MUC/28), but I am afraid that was later repudiated by the Soviet Union. In relation to the eight-nation memorandum he said that the Western Powers had no wish to proceed with it and that we had made efforts to drag the Soviet Union into detailed discussion. I shall be quite happy if my colleagues round the table will read the verbatim records and judge for themselves who is seeking to make progress on that document. I do not think it is appropriate to develop this matter now; I merely make clear that I cannot accept our Soviet colleague's interpretation of the position.

But I was sorry that Mr. Zorin seemed to reject out of hand our Brazilian colleague's suggestion that we should refer some of the problems of control to what I think he called a competent technical body, not a sub-committee. He was commenting there on my previous suggestion, and I certainly would not quarrel with his amendment. Probably a competent technical body would be preferable. It would certainly be preferable in relation to the argument that our Soviet colleague adduced, because he said he feared that this would merely divert us from our main task. I would not have thought that if we had a technical body working separately this would divert us in any sense. In all seriousness I would say that he should give this further thought. Certainly my initial reaction was that it seemed a most interesting and helpful suggestion.

I have one other point in immediate reply to Mr. Zorin. He referred to the need, as he saw it and as he has expressed it to us on many occasions, to eliminate altogether in the first stage nuclear delivery vehicles. I thought he used rather extravagant language this morning when he said that we had either to eliminate altogether nuclear weapons in the first stage or to make their delivery impossible, and no third alternative was possible. That was what I understood him to say. He went on to ask in what way we should seek to eliminate the differences on this matter. He asked whether we should seek to eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the first stage or should postpone it indefinitely. I would say this to him. That is not the question that confronts this Conference and it is confusing us to pretend that it is. The question that confronts this Conference is: How soon can we effectively eliminate the threat of nuclear war and conventional war too?



I do not say that any one delegation is in a position to say emphatically here that any one particular aspect must be completed in stage I. I think there is a real danger here, which I have tried to express before, that if one tries to compress too much into stage I the whole disarmament process may never get under way at all; that is what I fear, for the reasons which were so clearly put, I thought, again this morning by our Brazilian colleague -- the whole problem of control and of confidence which goes with control.

Mr. Zorin referred a little later, in reference to the Western Powers proposals, to "a snail's pace". I have no knowledge of how fast snails move in the Soviet Union, nor have I had the opportunity of verifying. But to suggest that a 30 per cent cut in stage I of all these armaments is a snail's pace conjures up in my mind a rather jet-propelled snail, which seems to me to be a proper analogy if one is going to use the word "snail" in this context. I do say to him that, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept the argument that he has adduced in this particular regard.

Now I would like to turn to the remarks I intended to make to the Committee today. I want to come back to this question of verification. I have, of course, dealt with it at some length in the past, and I wish I did not have to burden my colleagues with further references now. But it has become clear -- from what was said at our informal meeting yesterday and from recent speeches that we have heard from the Eastern bloc countries -- that there is still a very real lack of understanding of the Western proposals; and it is also very difficult for us to know precisely where the Soviet bloc stands. It really is very important that everyone should be clear as to what is being proposed, and I think that Mr. de Mello-France's speech this morning made this even more clear.

I say this in the light of several of the comments that we have heard recently and in the light of the question which was posed yesterday by our Bulgarian colleague and which he repeated this morning. The reason why I did not seek to answer it yesterday was, as he said, that there was not a great deal of time, but I wished to have the opportunity of dealing with it as soon as possible.

Now the question posed, as I understood it yesterday, was: how do we determine the tasks and duties in relation to verification, as well as the nature and volume of controls necessary, without having the nature of disarmament measures? I welcome the opportunity to deal with this question, because I am always conscious of the fact that some of our friends from the Eastern bloc claim

to think that the West is more interested in control than in disarmament. This is certainly not the case, and I give that firm assurance once again now. We want to see disarmament proceed steadily and realistically, and we only want such controls as will enable that to happen.

I would say straight away that I would not pretend that one can spell out precisely the full responsibilities in relation to verification until one studies the matters that are to be verified. Indeed, I think I am on record as having said this more than once already. But what I was asking for on Wednesday was only a rough idea from our Soviet colleague so that I could try and assess how his mind was working in this regard.

This rather re-emphasizes the value of objective studies by experts, but I will not press that further at the moment. As I understand it, in this Committee we are having general debates about general principles -- at the moment in relation to part I and subsequently in relation to the other stages of the draft treaty. These general principles relate just as much to verification as they do to the disarmament measures which verification must accompany. It is in that sense that the zonal sampling plan has been put forward for discussion in principle, and it is only when one State proposes in the first stage measures which seem to call for a very great degree of verification that one has to probe far more deeply into the feasibility of the verification measures that are intended to accompany that particular measure of disarmament. In that sense, the country which proposes the fullest measure of disarmament in stage I -- or indeed in other stages -- has the responsibility of proposing clearly adequate verification measures to accompany its own particular disarmament proposals.

This, of course, applies with very great force to the Soviet proposal for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I. It is, of course, that proposal more than anything else which highlights the need for a clear understanding on verification. The Western proposals, as everyone here knows and recognizes, are of course more modest in the first stage but, I would say, much more realistic; and the verification measures required in relation to the Western proposals are therefore equally less onerous.

Nevertheless, it is necessary even under the United States plan to have confidence that the measures agreed are being carried out, just as it is necessary to build up the international disarmament organization and to see it work effectively in the early stages so that all States may have confidence in its

ability to carry out its increasingly heavy burden as the later stages approach, as we get nearer and nearer to 100 per cent general and complete disarmament. That seems to me basic to the whole problem; that the international disarmament organization gradually gets going and that it increases in its efficiency, in its effectiveness, and in the confidence which it generates, as the stages proceed.

Our Soviet colleague has made a number of statements which, I am sure unwittingly, have led to a good deal of confusion of thought to many of us listening to them. Of course, first of all, it was the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, who stressed at our second meeting that they would not take the word of other countries about disarmament measures, nor would they expect other countries to take their word (ENDC/PV.2, page 11). That has been repeated since then by Mr. Zorin.

But also without confidence there can be no disarmament:

"Total verification, total disarmament and total confidence-generating measures are one and the same." (ENDC/PV.31, page 6).

These were the words used by the representative of Nigeria at our meeting on 4 May. They have already been referred to by our Brazilian colleague this morning. I think this is a basic point. Confidence has got to be built up; it can only be done, as we were reminded this morning, by adequate verification.

On the same day as Mr. Atta made the statement I have just quoted, Mr. Zorin said:

"I am telling you that we agreed to 100 per cent verification, and I add: 100 per cent verification throughout the territory of the Soviet Union." (ibid., page 50)

Now that was a very interesting statement. It aroused a certain amount of interest at the time -- indeed I think you, Mr. Chairman, commented on it -- and it did seem to be taking us definitely further than we had got at that stage.

But a difficulty arose. It seems that after Mr. Zorin made the above-quoted comment he felt that it was a little more than he had meant to say -- I do not know; perhaps he can tell us -- but I understand that at the Press Conference that he gave on 7 May, reported in the Journal de Genève on 8 May, he said -- I hope he will tell us if this is not correct -- that "For 100 per cent of destruction of vehicles, we would authorize 100 per cent verification over the whole territory of the Soviet Union in all those places where these vehicles are situated." Now that was a very important reservation, and I think one must take note of it.

So, having that in mind, the question of the verification of arms which have been described as "arms under the jacket" was still left open. It is clear from the verbatim records that both our United States colleague and my own colleague, Sir Michael Wright, in my absence, on 8 May did ask for further clarification on this (ENDC/PV.33); and on 11 May the representative of Canada recalled that he had previously asked:

"Would the Soviet Union be willing to let international inspectors visit every part of its territory to ensure that nothing existed outside the declared sites; and, if so, when would this be done?" (ENDC/PV.35, page 43)

Here it seems that our Soviet colleague has somewhat changed his arguments, because, having originally offered 100 per cent verification, he now begins to say that it is impossible. He has said this once or twice. He has added that we know it is impossible, and that this is why we have proposed the zonal inspection scheme. His remarks on this point are in verbatim record ENDC/PV.35.

In actual fact he has made this charge that we know that this is impossible and that this is why we have changed our own proposals. But this is not true, and I must tell him so, because at the time when the zonal proposals were first made neither, as far as I know, our Soviet colleague nor indeed anyone else had ever suggested that 100 per cent inspection was physically impossible -- difficult, yes, but nobody had said that it was impossible. The United States suggestion in regard to zonal inspection was made with the deliberate objective of trying to find some way to allay what we understood to be genuine Soviet fears in relation to espionage. This was an idea which was thought out and put forward as a suggestion in this regard.

Of course, one must face the fact that since zonal inspection is progressive, by the end of the process -- when we have reached the goal of general and complete disarmament -- it will itself be 100 per cent. It progresses by stages until it eventually becomes 100 per cent. Not all has to be inspected at once, but the provision is to leave behind sufficient people to see that the inspected zone remains clear, so it does eventually involve 100 per cent inspection.

On 16 May our Canadian colleague sought to interpret what this meant. He gave us some rather graphic descriptions and some interesting figures; but he made it clear that we did interpret 100 per cent literally, as meaning the right -- and I emphasize the word "right" -- to search every square inch of territory and every warehouse in it. This is what our Soviet colleague says is impracticable

and I am afraid that in saying that he has tended in some degree to exaggerate -- I am sure he did this unintentionally -- the point in regard to Mr. Burns' proposal. At that time Mr. Burns specified the numbers concerned and he came to a figure of 1,000 for 1 per cent. Interpreting that, Mr. Zerin said:

"But, according to your own calculations, to cover the territory of the Soviet Union even for topographical survey purposes would necessitate the employment of 100,000 controllers for six months."

(ENDC/PV.38, page 46)

That is a frightening figure. But, of course, under the Western plan there is no intention to inspect the whole territory of the Soviet Union in six months. That is the whole basis of the zonal sampling plan. Under Mr. Burns' proposal, if one were to examine 10 per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union in one year one would need 5,000 people; if one were to do it in six months one would need 10,000 people. This brings it down to the proportions that were intended by Mr. Burns'. And 5,000 people -- 5 infantry battalions -- is not a very large figure in relation to the total number of people we are hoping to see disbanded in regard to the Soviet Union alone. I merely use the Soviet Union for illustration, but these things would happen in other territories too. Therefore, this is the sort of figure one would have to have in mind. Mr. Burns made out a convincing case, I thought. Our Soviet colleague thinks it is not feasible. On this I would say: let us agree to differ. Let us agree to leave it to the international disarmament organization to build up its forces and find out from experience what it can do. After all, it must be remembered that it is not consonant with the Western proposal that the international disarmament organization should actually inspect every square inch of territory. But what we do demand is the right to do this if and when it is considered necessary. That is the key to it: not actually to do it, but to have the right to do it if in fact it is felt desirable. And it is this right to inspect an area which must involve the right for the international disarmament organization itself on the spot to decide whether this should be done or not.

Why do we insist on this right? On 16 May our Soviet colleague said that verification of reductions would afford:

"... if not a 100 per cent, then at least a 98-99 per cent guarantee that the actual disarmament process is proceeding correctly."

(ibid., page 47)

I do not know how our Soviet colleague arrives at this figure, because if we can verify only reductions I do not see how it can be claimed with any degree of certainty that the figure would be as high as 95 per cent or 98 per cent. I agree that it would be fairly high -- I grant that -- but I do not think that that sort of figure can be substantiated. There is certainly no basis on which to do so? These are merely estimates, and I would have thought the estimate might well be 80 per cent or even 70 per cent. It could be less -- I do not want to exaggerate my case in any sense here -- but I certainly do not think anybody could possibly say it could be 95 per cent or 98 per cent. But even if it were 95 per cent, and 5 per cent had remained, that 5 per cent would be decisive if the other side had conscientiously eliminated everything.

I said the other day that this reminded me of the old proverb that "In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king". This applies just as much here. This is the same argument. I would say that this has not yet been faced up to by our Soviet colleagues, and this is the possibility which we are being asked to accept -- despite the fact that, as I have reminded our colleagues this morning, both Mr. Zorin and Mr. Gromyko before him have said quite explicitly that they do not expect us to take their word.

That is the position, as I see it, with our Soviet colleagues. The Western plan, of course, does realistically accept these possibilities with its suggestion of zonal inspection. If only 30 per cent of delivery vehicles were eliminated in stage I, of course a 5 per cent variation such as I have referred to would not be nearly so serious in regard to the actual destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. If in fact somebody had hidden away 5 per cent, then it would mean that they would have 75 per cent left rather than 70 per cent, and there would still be a reasonable degree of balance between the two sides. If one wants to go to 100 per cent, then this becomes highly critical. This, I would say, is the weakness of the whole case that our Soviet colleagues have made out in regard to verification of 100 per cent. After all, we are all agreed -- I hope we are, and indeed I understand we are -- on the sixth of the Agreed Principles, which says:

"... the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage." (ENDC/5, page 2)

Our Soviet colleague, in proposing 100 per cent elimination, claimed initially that he would agree to 100 per cent verification but, on further examination, he tells us that his proposal is not truly for 100 per cent

verification and he seems then to take refuge in accusing the West of seeking the impossible. I have tried to show, and I think Mr. Burns did show, that this was possible. I have tried to show what we are really seeking to achieve. I have tried to show that in relation to what we are proposing in the field of disarmament these two things are tenable together.

I am not satisfied that what our Soviet colleague proposes is tenable in that way. He has said, in relation to the Western plan, that we would in fact require 100 per cent verification and that we had in fact called for this in our plan in relation to stage I. This is what worries me and makes me feel that he is not quite clear about what is proposed in the United States plan. I think that the verification provided for in the United States plan is made quite clear in paragraph 3.c. of section G., where it is stated:

"Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following ...."

(ENDC/30, page 13)

It goes on to explain the zonal sampling technique.

It is quite clear that this proposal for verification in the United States plan is not calling for that complete over-all examination of all remainders. In so far as remainders are concerned, it is content to rely on this zonal sampling technique. That seems to run counter to what Mr. Zorin said on Wednesday, as recorded in the verbatim record. I will not give the whole relevant quotation, for time is getting on, but Mr. Zorin read out certain aspects of the United States plan and went on to say:

"But here again you must carry out 100 per cent verification of this reduction i.e. of the retained forces, too, in order to provide such an assurance. Why then do you say that the question does not arise for you? It does arise for you. But for some reason you do not want to reply to it. I put the question to you because it comes up

in your plan, but you say that it does not and that the question does not arise in this form from the Western plan. Yes, it does arise. But I will tell you why you are unwilling to answer this question. Because you have no satisfactory answer - that is the crux of the matter. The answers that you tried to give today indicate that you have great difficulty in giving a satisfactory answer to this question."

(ENDC/PV.38, page 46)

I am not too sure about the logic of those last few lines. Anyhow, it is clear enough, I think, that our Soviet colleague feels that definitely we are requiring 100 per cent verification of remainders throughout. That leads me to think that he has not fully appreciated the implications of the United States plan. I hope that this further attempt of mine to answer him today and to show him that there is an answer, and a very effective answer, to what he has said will encourage him to give somewhat more sympathetic thought to this proposal. However, if it does not, then I say to him, as I have said before, that this problem has been in the forefront of our minds, or should have been, even before we arrived here, ever since the Agreed Principles of last autumn.

This proposal put forward by the United States is a genuine attempt to overcome this difficulty between us, but so far we have had not definite proposal of any sort by our Soviet colleagues to try to thrash out this problem and to find some way of meeting it. However, I did think that there was just one small ray of hope in what our Soviet colleague said on Wednesday. In the same speech to which I have already referred he said:

"You ask how the Soviet Union thinks the detection of clandestine stockpiles should be undertaken. My answer is that we should discuss this together." (ENDC/PV.38, page 47)

That sounded interesting to me: "We should discuss this together." Having that in my mind, I was rather expecting that when he heard the Brazilian representative's proposal this morning he would say: "Yes, this is exactly what I had in mind: let us study this together and consider it together." This is just what we want to do: to study and consider together. We do want some fresh proposals from our Soviet colleagues to help us to meet this really basic problem. It has been shown quite clearly this morning that it is a basic problem and one we have to face.



So I say once more that I hope very much we can have some presentation from the Soviet Union which will help us to deal with this -- and it has to be dealt with if we are going to make the effective progress that I think we all want to make, whatever degree of reductions may be agreed upon. We have to have some way of getting assurance to both sides that the control measures are adequate and that they are, in the words of our Brazilian and Nigerian colleagues, building up confidence together. Control, confidence and disarmament go together; that is the thing I want to emphasize.

I apologise for having spoken at some length on this, but I think it is important that we should be absolutely clear in our minds, that we should try to understand one another and that each side should try to bring forward measures to find a way of meeting this problem. I think one can say that the West has tried to bring forward such measures. So far we are still waiting for a response from our Soviet colleagues.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I had planned to make a somewhat lengthy statement this morning, in which I was going to present an extensive analysis of the peace-keeping machinery. However, in view of the lateness of the hour, I think that in justice to my colleagues I should defer that statement to our meeting on Monday. I shall therefore request to be inscribed first on the list of speakers for our meeting on Monday.

Following the statement which I shall make on the peace-keeping machinery, I plan to make a series of statements describing how we think the international disarmament organization would work. I then plan to make a somewhat further detailed and perhaps technical statement with respect to progressive zonal inspection and to compare it with 100 per cent inspection. I then plan to speak on surprise attack measures and military expenditure.

At this time I merely wish to make a brief remark on the difference between 100 per cent verification and progressive zonal inspection. As all my colleagues here know, one of the rocks on which previous disarmament negotiations foundered was the desire for 100 per cent certification and 100 per cent verification. In an effort to be reasonable and to reach some agreement, and to see to it that we moved from where we had been in the past, we introduced the idea of progressive zonal inspection.

I do not wish to pursue this matter this morning. However, I submit that my Soviet colleague is quite incorrect when he says that we have admitted that 100 per cent inspection is impossible. I submit that it is not impossible. But it has been, as I have said, one of the basic points of disagreement in trying to achieve disarmament. We have therefore brought forward this idea of progressive zonal inspection. However, merely because we have tried to be reasonable about this question and because we have brought forward a new idea for examination does not mean that we have admitted that, if one wanted to put one's mind to it, 100 per cent inspection could not be carried out.

I would like to say in conclusion that I listened with the greatest of interest to the brilliant statement made this morning by the representative of Brazil. We shall naturally wish to examine this statement most carefully in the verbatim record. I might just say in passing that when the representative of Brazil referred to the greatest war of all, that is the war against all war, it seemed to me this was the same thought that President Kennedy had when he said, in presenting the United States plan on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world to the General Assembly of the United Nations last autumn, that it was our intention to challenge the Soviet Union not to an arms race but to a peace race, and to advance together step by step and stage by stage until general and complete disarmament had been achieved (A/PV.1013). I quite agree with the representative of Brazil that we must work together in this peace race and that we have to build confidence. That, in fact, was the basis of what I was going to speak on this morning with respect to the peace-keeping machinery. I do agree with my colleague from Brazil that we must work together here to achieve that confidence which lies at the very basis of our work on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (India): Some direct suggestions and proposals were made during the course of the important statements that we heard today. First, there was the suggestion of the representative of Brazil that a competent technical committee should be set up to study the question of controls. Secondly, there was the suggestion made by the representative of the Soviet Union that we should proceed as soon as possible to the discussion of stage II measures, a suggestion which received some qualified support from the representative of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, there was the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union that we should instruct the co-Chairmen to try to bring closer the positions

(The Chairman, India)

expressed here on matters dealt with in stage I -- and I would add that I suppose that would mean matters dealt with in stage I of the two plans and in any suggestions that have been made by representatives in their statements on those plans.

I mention these three specific suggestions simply by way of summary.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): May I say to the Chairman that the representative of Bulgaria also made a concrete proposal which was very close to the one which was later made by the representative of the Soviet Union, namely, that a study should be made of certain points of both proposals so that they could be quickly adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (India): That is correct. We also have the suggestion made by the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to apologize; it seems that we have not done what we should have done. Yesterday the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and I agreed to propose to the Conference that the Committee of the Whole be convened on Tuesday. This was agreed between us, and therefore I think that we should inform the Conference accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I note that the representative of the United States gives his assent to the statement just made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I merely wish to say that since the Italian delegation recalled yesterday the urgency of resuming the work of the Committee of the Whole, I am grateful to the co-Chairmen for their decision.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In order that it should be quite clear as to what we are going to do in the Committee of the Whole, I wish to inform the Conference that, taking into account the wish and proposal expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic, we agreed that the representative of the Soviet Union should state his views in regard to the possibility of considering the three items which he has

proposed for discussion in the Committee of the Whole, and that the representative of the United States should state his views in favour of the three items proposed by the United States delegation. A general exchange of views would then follow in order to determine which question or questions of the six should be discussed more thoroughly and to prepare appropriate decisions.

That is the sense of our agreement. I think it will be satisfactory to all members, since the representative of the United Arab Republic and the representatives of other delegations expressed themselves in favour of this idea.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): I wish to thank the two co-Chairmen very much for accepting our proposal. I trust that the Committee of the Whole will have a very interesting and useful meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-ninth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lall, the representative of India.

"The representatives of Bulgaria, Brazil, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy and the United Arab Republic made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 21 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

"The next meeting of the Committee of the Whole will be held on Tuesday, 22 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.